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Court: California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Five
Appointed by: Governor Deukmejian, 1989
Born: October 12, 1947 in Shawnee, Oklahoma
Education: BA, Cal State Long Beach 1969; JD, UCLA 1972
Law Practice: Private practice in Encino and Los Angeles (1973-83)
Judicial Appointments: Los Angeles Municipal Court (1983-85); Los Angeles County Superior Court (1985-89); Second District Court of Appeal (1989-present)
Opinions Reported in Appellate Decisions Noted:
Additional Sources of Information:
Comments from Visitors to the Appellate Counsellor Home Page:
For instance, if one were to read and construe the State Court of Appeals decision under Williams vs. City of Los Angeles, 229 Cal.App.3d 1627 (May 10, 1991), one would readily conclude that\ the facts and law of the decision, falls way short of being applied against federal claims under T-VII and/or under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. Primarily because the 1991 decision acknowledges that an adverse employer action had taken place, and the adverse action was established as based upon impermissible factors. This, then, is a textbook example of a built-in established prima facie case for employment discrimination.
On the other hand, as the result of the abuse of the summary judgment procedure, Judges Tashima as the trial court, and Judges Beezer, Brunetti and Noonan of the 9th Circuit Appeals court, regulated away my right to prosecute Title VII and other federal claims, based strictly upon an interpretation [by the way false] of the above cited State of Appeals decision.
The federal summary judgment process, regulated and decided by the just named federal judges, factored out the true facts of adjudicated and settled State court claims establishing that a wrongful termination had taken place, and disposed of the federal claims, based upon the City of LA Defendant being allowed to misrepresent the State Appeals decision of 1991.
Due to the abbreviated format for federal summary judgments, it simplified the City attorney's and the federal judges tasks of suppression of the evidence of the employment termination, and made it easy for them to sub- stitute this with conjured evidence that I voluntarily surrendered my employment. But for the invocation of the summary judgment process to summarily dismiss all of my federal claims, the City of LA Defendant would have been hard pressed in convincing a jury of my peers, that I voluntarily surrendered my employment with the City, after being terminated from my employment by the City. The summary judgment process made it easy for such a result to take place. That procedure can be unconscionable,placed in the hands of unscrupulous judges and/or litigants.
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