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February 1999 
Vol. 5 No. 2 ISSN 1087-6219
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The Ninth Circuit has upheld an injunction barring enforcement of city and state housing discrimination laws against Christian landlords whose religious beliefs prevented them from renting to unmarried couples. The statutes interfered with “hybrid-rights” drawn from the Free Exercise Clause combined with the Takings and Free Speech Clauses.
Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker own residential rental properties in Anchorage, Alaska. They are “professed Christians” who believe that cohabitation between unmarried individuals is a sin. The court observed that those beliefs were firmly rooted in biblical text and in theological commentary, such as this remark by John Calvin: “There is nothing more opposed to holiness than the impurity of fornication, which corrupts the whole man.”
Both the State of Alaska and the City of Anchorage have laws that prohibit discrimination in housing sales and rentals on the basis of marital status. As a general rule, individuals must comply with valid and neutral laws of general applicability even if doing so would violate their religious beliefs. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). However, they need not do so if they are able to combine a free exercise claim with a “colorable” claim under another constitutional provision. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (refusing to require Amish parents to obey compulsory school attendance laws on the basis of Free Exercise and parental rights principles).
Thomas and Baker had a colorable takings claim, because the housing laws interfered with their “dominion” over their rental properties. They had a colorable free speech claim, because the statutes regulated religious speech based on its substantive content. Since the statutes placed a substantial burden on central religious beliefs, the governmental defendants had to show that they were necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. They could not, because there was no firm national policy against discrimination based on marital status.
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 1999 WL 11337 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
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The California Supreme Court has ruled that a school district was not liable for an injury caused when a student exited a school parking lot, and struck a nonstudent with his car on the sidewalk across from the school.
Frederick Hoff claimed that the Vacaville Unified School District owed him a duty because its officials knew that young drivers drove recklessly. The district had assigned traffic supervisors to direct traffic at its main parking lot, but not at the overflow lot involved in the accident.
Government entities are subject to general principles of tort liability. Those principles generally impose no duty to control the conduct of another. Hoff argued that the special relationship between the district and its students imposed a duty to control the students' conduct.
The district's liability is no greater than a parent's in the same circumstances. Parents have a duty to control their children only if they know about the dangerous tendencies that caused injury. In this case, there was no evidence that the student had exhibited any dangerous tendencies.
Hoff also relied on Education Code section 44807, which provides that teachers “shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess.” However, that statute was enacted to protect students, not nonstudents.
Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925 (1998).
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The California Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant may invoke the anti-SLAPP statute for any statement made in connection with an official proceeding, without having to establish separately that the statement itself concerned an issue of public significance.
The Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (ECHO) helped an African American tenant prosecute an administrative complaint and a small claims court action against landlords Dan and Judy Briggs. While participating in those proceedings, ECHO personnel called Dan Briggs a racist, and wrote “KKK” on a telephone message slip while talking to him. The Briggs sued ECHO for defamation and infliction of emotional distress.
ECHO moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. That statute requires plaintiffs in Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) to make an early showing of a prima facie case. The statute applies to lawsuits based on acts in furtherance of free speech rights in connection with a “public issue.” It defines such acts to include statements made before or in connection with a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. The Court of Appeal ruled that section 425.16 did not apply, because ECHO did not establish that its statements addressed an issue of public significance.
The statute's plain language refuted the Court of Appeal's interpretation. The clause that contained the “public issue” language was defined by the statute itself to include any statement made in connection with an official proceeding. The definition did not require that such statements concern a public issue.
The Court of Appeal's “strained” construction also contravened express legislative intent and public policy. The anti-SLAPP statute should be broadly construed to protect speech. Without a “bright line” test that applies the statute to any statement in connection with an official proceeding, there would be confusion and disagreement about what issues possessed sufficient public significance.
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 1999 WL 21255 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 1999).
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The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a Title VII plaintiff may invoke the equitable tolling doctrine if defendant's conduct psychiatrically disabled her from asserting her rights during the limitation period.
Cynthia Stoll worked at the Sacramento Post Office for six years. On June 22, 1990, she “fled the workplace to escape the extreme sexual harassment she was experiencing.” The harassment involved lewd comments and conduct by numerous male coworkers and supervisors. One supervisor raped her repeatedly when she declined his advances.
As a result of the harassment Stoll suffers from severe major depression and severe generalized anxiety disorder, as well as somatic form pain disorder. She attempted suicide four times. Her psychiatrist testified that, because of the abuse, Stoll had great anxiety and fear of anything to do with the Post Office. As a result, she could not communicate directly with the lawyer who represented her in administrative proceedings on her claim. The psychiatrist also testified that she was unable to understand and act on her legal rights.
Stoll's lawyer received the final administrative decision in the mail on March 25, 1996. Stoll filed a handwritten pro se complaint for sexual harassment on April 21, 1997, well past the 90-day limitation period for a Title VII claim.
Equitable tolling applies when plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct by the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances beyond her control make it impossible to file a claim on time. Stoll's delay in filing her claim was directly attributable to outrageous conduct by Post Office personnel. Her mental incapacity was an extraordinary circumstance beyond her control.
The fact that she had an attorney for the administrative proceedings did not defeat equitable tolling. The medical testimony established that the outrageous conduct had seriously damaged the attorney-client relationship.
Stoll v. Runyon, 1999 WL 12998 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1999).
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The Second District Court of Appeal in Los Angeles has ruled that the Los Angeles County Sheriff is not a County official for purposes of a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 regarding over-detention of inmates in the county jail.
Under Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), local governments are directly liable for section 1983 violations that result from official actions, policies or customs. When the Los Angeles County Sheriff establishes policies for releasing inmates from jail, he acts as a state, not a County official. The state is not subject to suit under section 1983.
The result in this case is governed by the California Supreme Court's decision in Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal. 4th 340 (1998), which held that a county district attorney was a state official. The same constitutional and statutory provisions provide for the California Attorney General to have direct supervision over district attorneys and sheriffs, and prohibit county boards of supervisors from interfering with the law enforcement functions of district attorneys and sheriffs.
State law expressly provides for county sheriffs to “take charge of and keep the county jail and the prisoners in it.” Therefore, the sheriff was acting for the state, and plaintiff could not pursue a section 1983 claim against the County.
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Peters), 68 Cal. App. 4th 1166 (1998).
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The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a plaintiff may pursue a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) even though he had secured disability benefits by stating that he was unable to work.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel may preclude a plaintiff from pursuing an ADA claim if he or she has secured a benefit by making a fundamentally inconsistent representation in an earlier proceeding. See Johnson v. State of Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998), which was discussed in the May 1998 issue of Appellate Decisions Noted.
In this case, plaintiff secured Social Security disability benefits by telling an administrative law judge that he had been unable to work since his injury, and was still unable to work. That was not an admission that he was unable to perform the specific tasks that constituted the essential functions of his job. A concurring opinion also pointed out that the ADA imposed a duty to make reasonable accommodations, while the Social Security laws did not.
Lujan v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1999 WL 23128 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 1999).
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Subsequent treatment of decisions reported on in earlier issues:
Adams v. City of Fremont (January 1999 issue), modified on denial of rehearing (Jan. 4, 1999).
Le Bourgeois v. Fireplace Mfrs., Inc. (January 1999 issue), now reported at 68 Cal. App. 4th 1049 (1998).
Lilley v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. (January 1999 issue), now reported at 68 Cal. App. 4th 939 (1998).
Lo v. Superior Court (December 1998 issue), petition for review filed (Dec. 22, 1998).
Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't (October 1998 issue), now reported at 159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998).
Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n (January 1999 issue), now reported at 162 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1998).
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